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Abstract
Stereotypes have pervasive, robust, and often unwanted effects on how people see and behave 
towards others. Undoing these effects has proven to be a daunting task. Two studies 
demonstrate that procedurally priming participants to engage in comparative thinking with a 
generalized focus on differences reduces behavioral and judgmental stereotyping effects. In 
Study 1, participants who were procedurally primed to focus on differences sat closer to a 
skinhead – a member of a negatively stereotyped group. In Study 2, participants primed on 
differences ascribed less gender stereotypic characteristics to a male and female target person. 
This suggests that comparative thinking with a focus on differences may be a simple cognitive 
tool to reduce the behavioral and judgmental effects of stereotyping. 
Word count: 118
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
- 3 -
Stereotypes are a blessing for social perceivers. They allow them to form impressions 
of and make judgments about others, even when processing capacity or relevant information
is scarce (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). However, this blessing is clearly mixed, as 
the efficiency advantages of stereotyping often come at the cost of reduced accuracy. Because 
social perceivers typically assimilate their judgments about members of a stereotyped group 
to the content of the pertinent stereotype, they may over-ascribe stereotypic characteristics to 
group members. Oftentimes, however, social perceivers are either internally motivated or 
externally pressured (Plant & Devine, 1998) to make judgments that remain uninfluenced by 
stereotypes. Achieving this goal is a daunting task that requires a sizeable chunk of the limited 
processing resources that cognitive misers (Taylor, 1981) have available (e.g., Bodenhausen, 
1988, 1990; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). What is more bothersome: Even if social 
perceivers allot precious processing resources, their judgments and behaviors are not 
necessarily protected against unwanted stereotypic influences. In fact, social perceivers who 
try to suppress a stereotype may later be troubled by rebound-effects that make stereotypic 
content even more accessible and consequently influence their judgment and behavior in 
subsequent tasks (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994). Because stereotype 
activation is often spontaneous (Bargh, 1999), its judgmental and behavioral consequences 
are difficult to undo. 
This is not only unfortunate, it is also surprising -- particularly from a somewhat 
broader perspective on stereotyping. Stereotyping effects capture the consequences of 
thinking categorically about others (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000) and are thus in essence 
category activation effects on person judgment. Other examples of such effects have proven 
to be more malleable. Activating trait categories (e.g. aggressiveness), for example, only 
yields assimilation effects on subsequent person judgments under specific circumstances (for 
an overview, see Förster & Liberman, 2007). 
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Recently, it has been suggested that this flexible nature of trait category activation 
effects can be partly attributed to one of the most fundamental characteristics of person 
judgment, namely its comparative nature (Mussweiler & Damisch, 2008). When people judge
themselves or others they inevitably make comparisons with accessible standards (Festinger, 
1954). Such comparisons contribute to category activation effects, because activating a 
particular category also activates category-consistent comparison standards that can then be 
compared to the target person (Smith & Zaraté, 1992). Activating the trait category of 
aggressiveness, for example, activates aggressive person standards (e.g., George Bush) that 
are then compared to the target person (Mussweiler & Damisch, 2008). Typically, this 
comparison will yield assimilative effects, because as a default, judges focus on similarities 
between comparison target and standard (Mussweiler, 2003). However, if judges focus on 
differences between target and standard during a comparison, then target judgments are not 
assimilated to the activated category, and may even be contrasted away from it. 
Recent research examining the consequences of trait category activation on person 
judgment demonstrates this possibility (Mussweiler & Damisch, 2008). Here, judges were 
procedurally primed to focus on either similarities or differences by comparing sketches of 
two scenes before a trait category was activated. This was done by simply asking half of the 
participants to list all the similarities between the two scenes they could find and asking the 
other half to list all the differences. Previous research has demonstrated that this task activates 
an informational focus on either similarities or differences that carries over to a subsequent 
person judgment task (Mussweiler, 2001). These person judgments were assimilated to the 
activated trait category if participants had been procedurally primed to focus on similarities, 
but not if they had been primed to focus on differences. A focus on differences thus countered
the typical assimilative consequences of trait category activation. This finding extends earlier 
work examining how comparison thinking influences trait category priming effects (e.g. 
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Stapel & Koomen, 2001). Whereas this earlier research suggested that comparative thinking 
per se may work against assimilative priming effects, these more recent findings, demonstrate 
that this is only true for one particular type of comparative thinking, namely comparisons that 
involve a focus on differences. 
In much the same way, a comparison focus on differences may also work against the 
assimilative effects of social category activation and may thus reduce stereotyping effects. 
Just as the activation of a trait category activates consistent standards, the activation of a 
social category is likely to activate stereotypic category members that are then compared to a 
target person (Smith & Zaraté, 1992). If this comparison involves a focus on differences, the 
previously described research suggests (Mussweiler & Damisch, 2008) that stereotyping 
effects may be reduced. The present research was designed to examine this possibility. To do 
so, we procedurally primed participants to focus on similarities or differences before they 
engaged in a stereotyping task. Study 1 examined how these alternative comparison foci 
influenced participants’ behavior towards the member of a stereotyped group. Study 2 
examined how these foci influenced judgments of group members. In both cases, we expected 
that a comparison focus on differences would reduce stereotyping effects. 
Study 1
In our first experiment, we procedurally primed (Smith, 1994) participants with a 
focus on similarities versus differences (Mussweiler & Damisch, 2008; Mussweiler, 2001) 
and then assessed their behavior towards a member of a stereotyped group. Specifically, we 
observed how far participants seated themselves from a chair that appeared to be occupied by 
a skinhead (Macrae, Bodenhausen et al., 1994). If a focus on differences reduces the extent to 
which negative stereotypic attributes are ascribed to the target person, this should reduce the 
tendency for participants to put distance between themselves and the skinhead, leading them 
to sit closer to him. 
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Methods
We recruited 36 university students as participants and offered them a compensation 
of € 6. 
The experiment was modeled after the classic study by Macrae and colleagues
(Macrae, Bodenhausen et al., 1994). Participants completed three different tasks that were 
ostensibly unrelated. First, participants worked on the stereotype activation task. Here, they
were given a picture of a skinhead and asked to take 5 min to describe a typical day in his life. 
In the second, the procedural priming task, we manipulated participants’ focus on 
similarities vs. differences (Mussweiler & Damisch, 2008, see also Mussweiler, 2001). All 
participants received sketches of two scenes depicting urban squares in the 19th century. We 
instructed about half of our participants to write down as many similarities and the other half 
to write down as many differences between the two scenes as they could find. Previous 
research (Mussweiler, 2001) has established that this task induces a focus on similarities 
versus differences that carries over to subsequent tasks. 
Participants were then informed that the final task would be administered in a different 
lab. While leading them to a nearby waiting room, the experimenter explained that they would 
be asked to take off their shoes and socks for a biopsychological study on temperature 
perception with one’s feet In the waiting room, seven chairs stood along the wall. The second-
closest chair to the door was ostensibly occupied by another person. A bomber jacket was 
hanging over the back of the chair and a pair of white laced military boots with sports socks 
was lying in front of it. These items are prototypical of the standard skinhead attire. As soon 
as participants took a seat, the experimenter ended the study and debriefed participants using 
funneled debriefing. Here, participants were probed for whether they saw a connection 
between the different tasks, and whether they had seen the target person as belonging to a 
social category other than skinhead. 
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In sum, Study 1 is based on a single factor (similarity vs. dissimilarity focus) between-
subjects design.
Results and Discussion
The funneled debriefing revealed that four participants saw the target person as a left-
wing punk – a category associated with characteristics that are opposite to those of the 
skinhead category. Given that – as is true for most items that could be realistically used in our 
experimental setup – the bomber jacket and military boots are not exclusively associated with 
a single social category, such alternative categorizations are inevitable. Five participants saw 
a connection between priming and seating task. These participants were excluded from further 
analyses, leaving a final sample of 27 participants. 
Our central dependent variable is participants’ seating position. We coded 
participants’ choice of chairs such that 1 indicates one of the chairs next to, and 5 the chair 
furthest away from, the chair occupied by the skinhead, who presumably may return at any
moment. If participants are less likely to stereotype the skinhead when focused on differences 
than when focused on similarities, this should be apparent in their seating choice. The results 
are consistent with this reasoning. Participants primed to focus on differences sat closer to the 
chair of the skinhead (M = 2.31, SD = 1.11) than did participants primed to focus on
similarities (M = 3.29, SD = 1.2), t(25) = 2.19, p < .04, d = 0.85. 
These findings suggest that a difference focus may reduce behavioral stereotyping 
effects. Stereotyping, however, is not only apparent in how we behave towards others, but 
also in how we judge and evaluate them. Study 2 was designed to examine whether
judgmental stereotyping effects may be similarly reduced by a difference focus. 
Study 2
To do so, we again induced participants to focus on similarities versus differences 
with a procedural priming task. Subsequently, they judged a male versus female target person 
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with respect to a number of characteristics that are closely related to the gender stereotype. 
We hypothesized that participants who focused on differences would see and judge the target 
persons in less stereotypic ways. 
Methods
We recruited 91 male and female university students as participants and offered them
a chocolate bar as compensation. 
Upon arrival in the lab, participants were asked to work on two separate tasks. The 
first task was the procedural priming task, which was identical to the one used in the Study 1. 
The second task was the stereotyping task. Here participants were instructed to assume the 
role of a personnel manager and to evaluate whether an employee was qualified for an IT-
training program based on some general information (e.g., short CV, comments from 
coworkers). For about half of the participants, the employee was female (“Christiane Müller”) 
for the other half he was male (“Christian Müller”). After forming an impression of the 
employee, participants were asked to judge him/her on nine dimensions including four critical 
ones. The critical attributes were closely related to stereotypes about male (technically skilled, 
logically skilled) and female (sympathetic, and compassionate) professional skills. They
appeared in the 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 8th position and were interspersed with stereotype-unrelated
dimensions (e.g., enthusiastic). Participants made their ratings for each attribute on a 9-point 
rating scale ranging from 1 (a little) to 9 (very). After completion of this task, participants 
were fully debriefed using a funneled debriefing, thanked for their participation, and offered 
their compensation. None of the participants were aware of the actual connection between the 
ostensibly unrelated tasks. 
In sum, Study 2 is based on a 2 (similarity vs. difference focus) X 2 (female vs. male 
target) between subjects experimental design. 
Results and Discussion
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We combined participants’ judgments on the stereotypic dimensions into one 
stereotypicality index by calculating the mean of the four attribute ratings (after reverse-
scoring ratings for the stereotypically male dimensions). Thus, higher values on this index
indicate that the target person was ascribed more stereotypically female skills and fewer 
stereotypically male skills. An analysis of ratings on the stereotype-unrelated dimensions 
revealed that they were uninfluenced by the gender of the target and the procedural priming, 
all F’s < 1. 
However, the procedural priming influenced participants’ rating on the stereotypic 
dimensions. As inspection of Figure 1 reveals, participants primed with a similarity focus
judged the female target (M = 5.61, SD = 0.58) to be more stereotypic female than the male 
target (M = 5.12, SD = 0.71), t(87) = 2.49, p < .02. For participants primed with a 
dissimilarity focus, this was not the case (M = 5.16, SD = 0.42 vs. M = 5.25, SD = 0.78), t < 1. 
This pattern produced a significant interaction effect in a 2 (similarity vs. difference focus) X 
2 (female vs. male target) ANOVA using the stereotypicality index as the dependent measure,
F(1, 87) = 4.91, p < .029, p2 = .05; F < 2.1, p > .24 for remaining effects. Including 
participant gender as a factor in this analysis did not change the results, and no effect 
including gender reached significance (all Fs < 1). 
These findings demonstrate that an induced focus on differences eliminates the 
judgmental consequences of activated stereotypes. 
General Discussion
These two studies provide converging support for the notion that a comparison focus 
on differences may reduce the judgmental and behavioral consequences of stereotyping. 
Participants who were procedurally primed to focus on differences sat closer to a member of a 
negatively stereotyped group (skinhead) and ascribed less gender-stereotypic characteristics to 
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a male and female target person. This finding seems particularly noteworthy because 
stereotyping effects are typically fairly robust and difficult to correct for. 
The present research extends previous findings examining the influence of different 
mindsets on stereotype activation (Sassenberg & Moskowitz, 2005). Specifically, this earlier 
research demonstrates that activating a broad mindset of creative thinking reduces the extent 
to which stereotypic associations are activated automatically. Although in this research a 
broad mindset of creative thinking was activated by simply asking participants to describe 
situations in which they had behaved creatively, one may speculate that among other things, 
this activated mindset also involves a focus on differences. The present studies go beyond this 
earlier demonstration, by (1) activating a specific information processing mechanism, namely 
a focus on differences, rather than a broad mind-set, (2) using a procedural priming 
manipulation to directly induce this difference focus, and (3) assessing consequences for 
stereotype use on the level of judgments and behavior rather than mere stereotype activation 
on the level of semantic associations. 
In the present research, we used a procedural priming task to directly induce a 
generalized focus on similarities versus differences. These respective foci, however, can also 
be induced by unobtrusive environmental cues. For example, past research has demonstrated 
that simply exposing participants to advertisement headlines that refer to differences (“feel the 
difference”) is sufficient to induce a focus on differences that shapes comparison processes 
and their ensuing judgmental consequences (Häfner, 2004). In light of the present findings,
such subtle cues may also help to reduce stereotyping effects. 
In contrast to alternative strategies that may be used to correct for stereotyping effects 
(Strack, 1992; Wegener & Petty, 1997) or to suppress unwanted stereotypes altogether, a 
difference focus does not drain social perceivers’ limited processing resources. In fact, it has 
been demonstrated that comparative thinking has efficiency advantages that allow judges to 
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make judgments quicker without becoming less accurate (Mussweiler & Epstude, 2008). This 
suggests that a difference focus may be the perfect tool in the cognitive misers’ toolbox
(Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994) to undo the unwanted behavioral and judgmental 
consequences of stereotype activation. 
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Figure 1: Means and standard errors for stereotypicality of judgments about a female or male 
target person (1-9) by similarity focus vs. difference focus. Higher values represent more 
stereotypically female evaluations. * p < .05
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